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1035, 19 A.L.R. 1119] ; Endicott v. Rosenthal, 216 Cal. 721,
725-727 [16 P.2d 673] ; Max Factor & Co. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal.
2d 446, 464 [55 P.2d 177]; Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 16720, d,
e (1), (2), (3); 16902.) [7b] Thus the injunction cannot
reasonably be interpreted as prohibiting defendants from contracting with their customers to provide services at such prices
as the customers may agree to pay. It only enjoins defendants
from agreeing among themselves to engage in the prohibited
activities.
Since the stipulated facts support the judgment as entered
and there is no evidence that would support a contrary conclusion, the order granting a new trial is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence,
J., concurred.
Edmonds, J., concurred in the judgment.

[S. F. No. 18539.
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WILLIAM BERGER, Appellant, v. MAURICE O'HEARN,
as Administrator, etc., Respondent.
[1] Limitation of Actions-Suspension of Statute-Death.-Generally, in absence of specific statute to contrary, intervening
death of obligor does not toll a general statute of limitations
on an accrued cause of action.
[2] Decedents' Estates-Statutes of Limitations-Actions Against
Estate.-Code Civ. Proc., § 353, declaring that if person against
whom an action may be brought dies before time limited for
its commencement an action may be filed within one year after
issuing of letters testamentary or of administration, in effect
gives claimant a period of grace of one year from issuance of
[1] Application and limits of rule that death of person liable
does not interrupt running of statute of limitations, note, 174
A.L.R. 1423. See, also, Oal.Jur., Limitation of Actions, § 158;
Am.Jur., Limitation of Actions, § 212.
[2] See Oal.Jur., Executors and Administrators, § 942 et seq.;
Am.Jur., Executors and Administrators, § 924 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Limitation of Actions, § 108; [2, 3]
Decedents' Estates, § 834; [4, 6, 7] Decedents' Estates, § 549; [ 5]
Decedents' Estates, § 504.
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letters in any case in which general statute of limitations
would have expired before end of such period.
!d.-Statutes of Limitations-Actions Against Estate.-Code
Civ. Proc., § 353, does not aid claimant where time fixed by
general statute of limitations did not expire until more than
one year after obligor's death; it is applicable only when
necessary to extend general statute of limitations and cannot
be used to curtail it.
!d.-Claims-Period for Suit After Rejection.-Code Civ.
Proc., § 353, is sole provision affecting period of limitation
on a cause of action in event of disability resulting from death
of person liable, and Frob. Code, § 714, declaring that where
a claim is rejected by legal representative of decedents' estate
the claimant must bring his action within three months after
receipt of written notice of rejection, and similar provisions
of Probate Code, are concerned strictly with matters of probate procedure and may shorten but cannot lengthen general
statute of limitations.
Id.- Claims- Presentation Before Notice to Creditors.-A
claim against decedent's estate may be filed at any time after
letters of administration are issued, regardless of whether
notice to creditors has been published.
!d.-Claims-Period for Suit After Rejection.-Although during 10-day period before action against decedent's estate on a
claim could be commenced (Frob. Code, § 712) the general
statute of limitations would have been suspended, such action
was barred by limitation where claimant's complaint was filed
more than one year and a half after statute had run.
!d.-Claims-Period for Suit After Rejection.-Mere filing
of claim against decedent's estate with probate court does not
amount to commencement of action on claim within meaning
of statute of limitations in view of express statement in Code
Civ. Proc., § 350, that an action is commenced when complaint
is filed. (Declaring that contrary dictum in Beckett v. Selover,
7 Cal. 215, 241, decided prior to enactment of § 350, is no
longer correct.)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Mateo County. Murray Draper, Judge. .Affirmed.
.Action against administrator on claim for alleged indebtedness of decedent. Judgment for defendant on sustaining
demurrer to complaint without leave to amend, affirmed.
William Berger, in pro. per., W. L . .A. Calder and .Abraham
Glicksberg for .Appellant.
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Samuel L. Fen del, Sol Silverman, James A. Toner and
William W. Coshow, for Respondent.
EDMONDS, J.-William Berger, assertedly a creditor of
the estate of V. B. McMahan, brought this action after his
claim had been rejected. The administrator's demurrer to
the complaint was sustained without leave to amend. The
question presented for decision upon Berger's appeal from
the judgment thereafter entered concerns the applicability
of a general statute of limitations.
According to Berger's complaint, in 1945 McMahan became indebted to him upon an account stated and suit was
commenced to recover the amount of the debt. That action
since has been dismissed for lack of prosecution. McMahan
died in 1947, and letters of administration were issued to
Maurice 0 'Hearn. In February, 1948, within the prescribed
statutory time, Berger presented a claim against the estate,
based upon the pending suit. No further action in regard
to the claim was taken by either party until more than
three years later. Berger was then given formal written
notice that it had been rejected and shortly afterward he
filed the present action.
In support of the demurrer, the administrator asserts that
the complaint, on its face, shows the bar of the statute of
limitations.
The period of limitation applicable to the claimed indebtedness is four years, commencing at the time the account was
stated. (Code Civ. Proc., § 337 [2].) Unaffected by the intervening death of McMahan, the :final date upon which
Berger could commence an action upon the debt would have
been November 13, 1949.
[1] As a general rule, in the absence of a specific statute
to the contrary, the intervening death of an obligor does not
toll a general statute of limitations upon an accrued cause
of action. (See Tynan v. Walker, 35 Cal. 634, 638 [95 Am.
Dec. 152]; Wood, Limitations [4th ed.] § 6; 34 Am.Jur.,
Limitation of Actions, § 212, p. 170.) It has been recognized,
however, that such a rule often may result in hardship to
creditors whose right of action might expire between the
debtor's death and the commencement of administration of
the estate. Accordingly, in many states statutes have been
enacted which extend the limitation period so as to give the
creditor an opportunity to bring an action against the personal representative. (See note, 174 A.L.R. 1423.)
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[2] Section 353 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:
''If a person against whom an action may be brought dies
before the expiration of the time limited for the commencement thereof, and the cause of action survive, an action may
be commenced against his representatives, after the expiration of that time, and within one year after the issuing of
letters testamentary or of administration.'' In effect, this
section gives a claimant a period of grace of one year from
the issuance of letters in any case in which the general statute
of limitations would have expired before the end of such
period.
[3] The administrator correctly contends, however, that
section 353 does not aid Berger because the time fixed by
the general statute of limitation did not expire until more
than one year after the death of McMahan. The provision is
applicable only when necessary to extend the general statute
of limitations and cannot be used to curtail it. (Lowell v.
Kier, 50 Cal. 646, 648; Harris v. Mount Washington Co.,
55 Cal.App. 144, 146 [202 P. 903] .)
[4] Berger takes the position that section 714 of the Probate Code also may operate to extend the general statute
of limitations. Uniformly, however, the decisions of this
state have held that section 353 of the Code of Civil Procedure is the sole provision affecting the period of limitation upon a cause of action in the event of a disability
resulting from the death of the person liable. Section 714
and similar provisions of the Probate Code are concerned
strictly with matters of probate procedure. (Bank of
America v. Thomas, 7 Cal.2d 154, 156 [59 P.2d 990]; Barclay v. Blackinton, 127 Cal. 189, 193-194 [59 P. 834]; McMillan v. Hayward, 94 Cal. 357, 361 [29 P. 774]; Dodson v.
Greuner, 28 Cal.App.2d 418, 421-422 [82 P.2d 741] ; see
Scott Stamp & Coin Co. v. Leake, 9 Cal.App. 511, 515 [99
P. 731] .)
In Barclay v. Blackinton, supra, the decision was based
upon facts identical in all material respects with those shown
by the present record. It was contended that section 714
of the Probate Code (formerly Code Civ. Proc., § 1498) increased the time for suing upon a claim to three months after
its rejection. After a review of the authorities in other jurisdictions, the court pointed to the prevailing rule that general
statutes of limitation, and special or "nonclaim" statutes
similar to section 1498, serve different functions and operate
independently of each other. (Citing 2 Woerner's American
Law of Administration, § 400; see also ibid. [3d ed.] § 400,
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p. 1320.) A nonclaim statute "may shorten but cannot be
held to lengthen the general statute of limitations." (P. 193;
accord Gray Realty Co. v. Robinson, 111 Utah 521 [184 P.2d
237]; Malone v. Averill, 166 Iowa 78 [147 N.W. 135].)
Relying upon Estate of Caravas, 40 Cal.2d 33 [250 P.2d
593], Berger argues that the statute of limitations was tolled
during the period in which the claim was not acted upon by
the administrator. Apparently his argument is based upon
section 356 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides:
"When the commencement of an action is stayed by injunction or statutory prohibition, the time of the continuance of
the injunction or prohibition is not part of the time limited
for the commencement of the action."
In the Caravas case, a nonresident alien, as heir of her
son's estate, petitioned to recover certain property which had
been distributed to the state treasurer pursuant to section
1027 of the Probate Code. The trial court denied the petition on the ground that the action was filed more than five
years after the distribution of the estate and thus was barred
by section 1026 of the Probate Code.
This court reversed the judgment. It was held that during
a substantial part of the five-year period the country of the
petitioner's resident was occupied by an enemy of the United
States and, by the Trading With the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C.A.
Appendix § 2), she was disabled from instituting a proceeding to enforce her rights in the estate. Accordingly under
sections 354 and 356 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
period of disablement was excluded from the time fixed by
the limitation provision of section 1026.
No such disablement appears in the present case. Berger
had more than one year after letters of administration were
issued to 0 'Hearn in which to enforce his claim. [5] He
could have presented his claim at any time after letters
were issued, regardless of whether notice to creditors had
been published (Janin v. Bro·wne, 59 Cal. 37, 43), and brought
his action after 10 days from the date his claim was presented. (Prob. Code, § 712; San Francisco Bank v. St.
Clair, 47 Cal.App.2d 194, 199-200 (117 P.2d 703]; Ratterree
Land Co. v. Security-First Nat. Bank, 26 Cal.App.2d 652,
657 [80 P.2d 102] .) [6] Although during the 10-day period
before an action could be commenced the general statute of
limitations would have been suspended (Nally v. McDonald,
66 Cal. 530, 532 [6 P. 390]), Berger's complaint was filed
more than one year and a half after the statute had run.
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[7] Berger's final contention is that the filing of a claim
with the probate court itself amounted to the commencement
of an action within the meaning of the statute of limitations.
However, section 350 of the Code of Civil Procedure expressly states that "[a]n action is commenced, within the
meaning of this title, when the complaint is filed.'' Beckett
v. Selover, 7 Cal. 215, 241 [68 Am.Dec. 237], was decided
prior to the enactment of section 350, and the contrary dictum
in that decision no longer is correct. (See Maurer v. Kirng,
127 Cal. 114, 117 [59 P. 290]; Barclay v. Blackinton, supra,
p. 194; Estate of Garnet, 126 Cal.App. 344, 346 [14 P.2d
572] .)
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I disagree with the construction placed, by the majority,
upon the statutes in question. In the main, that construction
is based upon the old case of Barclay v. Blackinton, 127 Cal.
189 [59 P. 834], which was decided in 1899 before the amendment to section 1498 (now Prob. Code, § 714) of the Code
of Civil Procedure.
The chrono1 ogy of the factual situation as disclosed by the
record is as follows :
The obligation here involved was incurred shortly prior
to December 6, 1945.
The defendant died in July, 1947.
Letters of administration were issued on his estate in
August, 1947.
Plaintiff's creditor's claim was filed February 3, 1948, within the statutory time.
Written notice of the rejection of the claim was given to
plaintiff on February 20, 1951.
Present action commenced by plaintiff on claim on April
18, 1951.
General four-year statute limitation expired in November,
1949.
Section 353 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that
an action may be commenced against the legal representative
of a deceased person within one year after the issuance of
letters testamentary or of administration. Section 712 of
the Probate Code provides that if the executor or administrator
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neglects or refuses to allow or reject a claim for ten days after
its filing, it may be deemed rejected on the tenth day. Section
714 of the Probate Code provides that within three months
after written notice of rejection of a claim, suit must be
brought thereon.
As above seen, a claim was duly filed in the instant case on
lilebruary 3, 1948; formal notice of rejection of the claim was
given to plaintiff on February 20, 1951, some three years after
the claim was filed. After receipt of the formal notice of rejection of his claim, plaintiff promptly began his action; the general statute of limitations ran on the obligation in November,
1949. Section 712 of the Probate Code provides that the claimant may at his "option" deem the claim rejected on the tenth
day; the section is not mandatory, but permissive. Section
714 of the Probate Code provides that suit must be brought
on a claim within three months after formal written notice
of rejection. Sections 710 and 711 (claims filed with clerk
and claims presented to executor or administrator) provide
that the executor or administrator rnust allow or reject the
claims. The executor or administrator rnust either allow or
reject the claim, but if he does not do so the claimant, at his
own option, may await his action which, if it be to reject the
claim, then gives the claimant three additional months in
which to bring an action. To so construe the sections makes
them harmonious. To construe them, as is done in the majority
opinion, has the effect of rendering nugatory the optional
provision in section 712, the mandatory provisions of sections
710 and 711 and the three months' provision in section 714.
For example, a claim is filed within the time allowed and is
not acted upon by the administrator or executor. If the claimant, at his option, decides not to deem the claim rejected but
desires to await the action of the executor or administrator,
relying upon the three months' provision in section 714, he
will, if the general statute has run in the interim, find himself
without a remedy. Since the sections ( 710 and 711) provide
that action rnust be taken by the administrator or executor,
section 712, which gives the claimant an option to deem it
rejected in 10 days, can have no purpose but to permit (not
to compel), if desired, action for recovery on the claim prior
to action by the representative of the deceased rejecting
the claim.
Barclay v. Blackinton, sttpra, 127 Cal. 189, 193, which is
factually similar to the case under consideration, had this to
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say: ''It is said that under the Code of Civil Procedure, section 1498 [now Probate Code, § 714], the plaintiff had three
months after the claim was formally and officially rejected
by the administrator in which to bring his action. We do not
so construe the statute. The section may shorten but cannot
be held to lengthen the general statute of limitations. The
special limitation of time within which suit must be brought
against the estates of deceased persons are called in many
states statutes of nonclaim or of short or special limitation.
These limitations exist independent of and collateral to the
general law of limitations. (2 Woerner's American Law of
Administration, sec. 400, and cases cited.) '' Ten years after
the decision in the Barclay case was handed down, section
1498 (now Prob. Code, § 714) was amended so as to provide
that written notice of the rejection of a claim "shall be given
by the executor or administrator to the holder of such claim.''
Prior to that amendment, no written notice of rejection had
been provided for before the three months' period for suit on
the claim commenced to run. In Estate of Wilcox, 68 Cal.
App.2d 780, at page 785 [158 P.2d 32], it was specifically
held that the first part of section 714 of the Probate Code
was a statute of limitations. In Fifield v. Bullwinkel, 81
Cal.App. 440, at page 442 [253 P. 962], it was held that
'' . . . it follows that without regard to the time of publication
of notice to creditors, the period of three months as limited
by section 1498 [Prob. Code, § 714] of the Code of Civil Procedure, within which the claimant must bring his action upon
a rejected claim, begins to run on the date when the executor
first gives to the claimant written notice of such rejection."
(Emphasis added.)
This section (Prob. Code, § 714) deals expressly and specifically with the bringing of an action upon a rejected claim in
probate. The remedy there afforded is conditioned only upon
the claimant commencing his action within three months after
receipt of notice of rejection from the executor or administrator. There is no requirement that the action must be
brought within one year after the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration. To hold, as is held by the
majority, that the action must be brought within a year from
the issuance of letters, or within the period of the general
statute of limitation, is to render nugatory not only the three
months' period provided for by section 714 but the mandatory
provisions of section 712 of the Probate Code relating to
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notice of allowance or rejection of claims by the executor or
administrator.
The rule is well established that all of the statutory provisions in all of the codes must be read together and harmonized
if possible. As stated by this court in In re Porterfield, 28
Cal.2d 91, at page 100 [168 P.2d 706, 167 A.L.R. 675] : "It
is a well-recognized rule that for purposes of statutory construction the codes are to be regarded as blending into each
other and constituting but a single statute. [Citing cases.]"
It would seem that under this rule the provisions of the Code
of Civil Procedure relating to the time within which actions
must be commenced should be so construed as to give effect
to the above cited provisions of the Probate Code relating to
the approval and rejection of claims against estates of deceased
persons and the commencement of an action for recovery of
a rejected claim. The majority opinion gives no consideration
to the above-mentioned rule.
In my opinion, the rule of the Barclay case which was laid
down in 1899, should be restated in the light of the present
statutes as well as in the light of present day conditions. It is
placing too great a burden on attorneys today to hold that
they must deem a claim rejected and commence an action
thereon at the close of the 10-day period provided for in
section 712 of the Probate Code or run the risk of their
elient 's claim being barred by a general statute of limitation;
it is also not in harmony with the provisions of that section
and those of section 714 of the same Code.
Under the interpretation placed on the above-mentioned
statutes by the majority opinion it would be possible for the
general statute of limitation to run either before a claimant
had an opportunity to present his claim against the estate
of a deceased debtor or before he could bring suit on the claim
after presentation of it, but that situation does not exist in
this case. However, the statute should be construed so as
to afford a remedy to a claimant under any factual situation
which might arise.
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January 11,
1954. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should
be granted.
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